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In September 2019, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the
world’s largest security-oriented organization responsible for arms control and, most
prominently, human rights, freedom of speech, and freedom of association in Europe, held its
annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) in Warsaw, Poland. The purpose of
the HDIM is to offer civil society organizations from across Europe and around the world a
chance to commingle, discuss pressing issues and enduring questions in their respective fields,
and relay developments in human rights and liberties to the government and non-government
organizations that are in attendance. However, these aims were frustrated in Warsaw in 2019 as
numerous “GONGOS”—Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations—supported
by the Russian Federation and members of the Eurasian Economic Union were present at the
HDIM. These GONGOS offered “controversial” and “alternative” narratives to the facts that
were presented by the delegations of U.S. and EU funded or supported Civil Society
Organizations (CSOs) that were also in attendance.
The controversial and alternative narratives espoused by GONGOS at the HDIM in Warsaw led
an entire Ukrainian government delegation to walk out and yell in protest, following the proKremlin comments of a Russian GONGO which supported Moscow’s position on the conflicts in
Donbass and Crimea, Ukraine (Synovitz 2019). As the U.S. Helsinki Commission has stated,
“GONGOs are funded and sometimes created by governments to participate in the meetings,
praise the regime, and take up time in order to minimize the length and impact of real NGO
statements,” and those present at the HDIM were no different. These GONGOS, supported by
Russian officials who were attending the HDIM, not only made incendiary and fraudulent
comments but challenged recognized NGOs, civil activists, and journalists who shared and
vocalized the OSCE’s position on various issues throughout Europe. One such issue is the
Russian invasion of Crimea and Donbass, which the OSCE views as an illegitimate invasion of a
sovereign country. Some attending organizations, such as CrimeaSOS, went one step further than
the OSCE in accusing the Russian Federation of human rights abuses for its treatment of local
Tartar populations and its active attacks on freedom of speech and association in Ukraine’s
occupied areas. In response to the accusations, pro-Kremlin Journalist Maria Volkonskaya
criticized CrimeaSOS, saying “these people are members of a terrorist organization banned in
Russia and in many other countries and their work has nothing to do with any form of
journalistic activity," while Russian government delegate to the OSCE Kiril Ignatov claimed the
HDIM was being used “to encroach on the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation,”
(Synovitz 2019).
However, Russia’s use of GONGOs and interest in manipulating U.S. policy toward Eurasian
civil society space does not begin or end with the 2019 HDIM. The example of Ukrainian
delegates walking out in protest of GONGO comments, or the attacks on traditionally recognized
NGOs, civil activists, and journalists by Russian state officials at the HDIM, represent a growing
Russian strategy to utilize civil society organizations and multilateral platforms in order to
undermine U.S. policy and promote Russian interests in Eurasia. From fraudulent GONGOs
guided by Russian state actors to internet trolling, incendiary comments, and taking over event
spaces at U.S. and EU funded civil society events such as the HDIM, the Kremlin propagates
pro-Russian narratives, bogs down substantive debates in the field of human rights, and hinders
U.S. policy regarding democratization, anti-corruption, and the westernization of the post-Soviet
space. In the past decade and a half, the Russian Federation has made a marked shift in its policy
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toward civil society in its near abroad, adopting an “if you can’t beat em’, then join em’ and
manipulate em’” strategy which often coopts American efforts to promote legitimate civil society
in the region and obfuscates said efforts via GONGOs and other Russian state-run organizations.
Strangely enough, Russia has not always pursued this policy of disinformation and
destabilization using western civil society formats themselves. In the crucible that was the 1990s
in the Russian Federation, Moscow looked upon the post-Soviet space and the United States’ and
the European Union’s growing support for local and international civil society in the region with
a mixture of reverence, concern, and, at times, hostility. Proponents of democratization in the
Russian Federation proper, such as Russian President Boris Yeltsin, were known advocates for
expanding civil society, while critics of U.S.-led civil society, such as Russian Foreign Minister
Yevgeny Primakov, were known for their skepticism toward “liberalization” in and around the
Russian Federation. Generally, the Russian Federation of the 1990s and early 2000s viewed
U.S.- and EU-supported civil society with caution. Many Russian figures saw U.S. policy as a
means for the proverbial “West” to influence the political, economic, and security sphere of
Russia’s “near abroad,” while some in Moscow insinuated nefarious motives behind the United
States’ support for these new “local movements.”
However, by the end of the Yeltsin-Primakov era, Moscow’s leadership exhibited a keen interest
in formulating a “Russian” civil society that could counter U.S. and EU civil society, one that
would adhere to what the Kremlin wanted said and done. In the Putin-Lavrov Era, NCOs, or
“Non-Commercial Organizations” as they are referred to in Russia, were culled and groomed to
fit this new format. Small dissenting think tanks, NGOs, and charity organizations were
dismantled through Duma legislation. One such measure was a 2012 law on “foreign funding,”
whereby all non-commercial entities were required to disclose their funding sources and accept
foreign agent status if receiving direct funds from abroad. Commenting on the scope of this law
in 2017, Vladimir Putin indicated that organizations flagged for receiving foreign funds must
either cease their political activity, leave Russia, or receive funding only from government
approved sources (Svetova 2019).
As a result of these measures, the predominant think tanks in the Russian Federation today—the
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Valdai Discussion Club, Russian International Affairs
Council, and Russian Institute for Strategic Studies—receive funding and support largely from
the Russian executive office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MGIMO University, and private
oligarchs (Atlantic Council 2019). The new financial reality has made these Russian NCOs a
vehicle for pursuing foreign policy objectives and a domestic mouthpiece for legitimizing
alternative facts. In other words, by the end of the 2000s, the Russian Federation had created a
domestic framework for the GONGOs it would soon release in it is “near abroad” in countries
such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, and at events such as the HDIM in 2019.
After the 2000s, these GONGOs were no longer limited to the Russian Federation but were
quickly incorporated in countries of interest to the Kremlin, and specifically post-Soviet
countries reorienting themselves away from Russia and towards the EU and the United States.
According to a Chatham House article, entitled “Agents of the Russian World: Proxy Groups in
the Contested Neighbourhood,” GONGOs associated with the Russian Federation and member
states of the Eurasian Economic Union “are particularly active in Ukraine, Georgia, and
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Moldova – countries that have declared their intention to integrate with the West,” and “they also
operate in the Baltic States as well as in the wider Balkan region, especially in Serbia and
Bulgaria, and their presence has grown in Kyrgyzstan since it became a member of the EEU in
August 2015.” Given the United States’ strategic partnership with The Republic of Georgia, U.S.
political and economic interest in Ukraine, and above all, the growing recognition of Ukraine’s
and Georgia’s desire to attain NATO membership and to further integrate into the EU through
anti-corruption, democratization, and other liberalizing initiatives, the destabilizing effect of
Russian GONGOs are grave.
As Free Russia Foundation editor and journalist Michael Weiss put it at a foundation event in
Kyiv, Ukraine in 2019, “I am terrified of GONGOs;” per his explanation at the event, and for the
reasons mentioned above, he is correct to hold this opinion. Yet for all that Russian GONGOs
can do to limit and disrupt U.S. and EU policy in the post-Soviet space and Russia’s near abroad,
they can also benefit U.S. policy and cripple Russia’s position in these areas.
According to the former Head of the U.S. Mission to the OSCE, Ambassador Daniel Baer,
“repressive regimes unable to convincingly respond to criticism from ‘bona fide’ civil society
organizations have found they can set up their own fake organizations that will shill for the
government in an attempt to distract from repressive failings,” and “GONGOs masquerading as
bona fide civil society organizations frequently team up with repressive governments’ statecontrolled media. In a synergy of fake news and fake advocates that helps repressive regimes to
create theoretical illusions to justify their grasp on power.” The key phrase here is “theoretical
illusions to justify their grasp on power.” In certain regions, such Ukraine and the Republic of
Georgia, or at certain events, such as the HDIM, GONGOs and their partners can achieve minor
disruptions but are generally less effective than internationally recognized CSOs. The exploits of
the former translate into minimal tangible victories when it comes to winning hearts or minds in
these regions, or discouraging western countries from further encroachment into Russia’s
periphery. While hybrid warfare rages in Donbass, Ukraine and South Ossetia, Georgia, ‘civil
warfare’ carried out by GONGOs rages in cities like Kyiv and Tbilisi, but this has done little to
help Russia consolidate support from the populations it targets or move targeted regions away
from the EU. In fact, Russia is worse off today, using GONGOs and obfuscating the civil society
space, than yesterday when it simply opposed civil society. For example, a 2019 International
Republican Institute Poll concluded that more than 53 percent of Ukrainians now want Ukraine
to join NATO compared to 34 percent in 2014, before civil or hybrid warfare broke out in the
region (Grytsenko 2019).
In summation, it is true that the Russian Federation has been able to successfully obfuscate U.S.
policy in Eurasia through GONGOs and the civil society space they penetrate. However, these
efforts have proven to have mixed effects on both U.S. and Russian policy in these areas, and
certain attempts to undermine U.S. policy initiatives have reverberated in favor of Washington
more than Moscow. Subsequently, the best position the U.S. can take is to remain resolute in
supporting civil society and to refrain from making concessions to Russia in Eurasia, regardless
of the disruption these GONGOs and the Russian Federation may pose to the implementation of
U.S. policy in the region.
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